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SOUTH AFRICAN AIRLINE PILOTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF ADVANCED FLIGHT DECK
AUTOMATION
Dr. Preven Naidoo.
Dept. of Human Resource Management
University of Pretoria, South Africa
This article reports on the construction of the Automation Attitude
Questionnaire (AAQ), to assess airline pilots’ perceptions about operating
advanced automated aircraft. A total of 262 airline pilots from a large
South African carrier participated in the validation of the questionnaire. A
five-factor measurement model was established by using exploratory
factor analysis. The five factors associated with perceptions of advanced
automated systems were labelled as: Comprehension, Training, Trust,
Workload, and Design. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients and the mean
inter-item correlation of each factor were highly satisfactory and
confirmed the homogeneity and unidimensionality of the five-factor
solution for the AAQ.
Advancements in computer and processing technology compounded by economic demands
have given rise to increasingly electronic flight deck design on aircraft. During the 1980s
there was a rapid development of automated apparatus, which were incorporated, in large
aircraft. Significant developments included inertial reference systems (IRS), flight guidance
systems, auto-throttle/thrust systems, data and flight management systems (FMS), and various
crew alerting systems (Boeing EICAS and Airbus ECAM) (Risukhin, 2001; Wiener, 1989).
In general terms, the new technology manifested itself as ‘the glass cockpit’ ‘(displays driven
by computer graphic systems)’ (Wiener, 1988, p. 435). The integration of automation into
commercial aircraft flight decks has contributed to greater efficiency, productivity and overall
safety (Wiener, 1993).
The introduction of automation to the modern aircraft flight deck, however, has also resulted
in a debate ‘for’ or ‘against’ such automation (Risukhin, 2001). Wiener (1989, p.1) indicated
that as the level of automation increased there was ‘a growing discomfort that the cockpit
may be coming too automated.’ Human factor issues such as poor interface design, pilot
complacency and over-reliance on automation, deteriorating flying skills and diminished
situational awareness began to be considered (Billings, 1997; Palmer, 1995; Parasuraman, &
Riley, 1997; Wood, 2004).
The results of the survey related to airline pilots’ perceptions towards operating advanced
automated flight deck systems is presented as a two part article series. In part one the need for
the study and the construction of the Automation Attitude Questionnaire (AAQ) is described.
In the second article the relationship between the airline pilots’ perceptions of flight deck
automation and their personal characteristics and operational position are explored.
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In the present study the researchers seek to identify the core human factor issues related to
advanced flight deck automation and to construct a valid and reliable instrument to measure
the perceptions of airline pilots towards operating advanced automated aircraft.
Background
Humans operating flying machines started only a century ago when Orville Wright famously
took the controls of the magnificent Wright ‘Flyer’ in 1903 and became airborne for a
distance approximately the length of a modern Boeing 747-400 (Crouch, 2003). However, the
wooden flyer had initially stalled during the Wright brothers’ first attempt at flight, and this
was arguably the first ever man-machine aviation-related accident, as described in this
paragraph by Wilbur Wright after the incident: ‘…the power is ample, and but for a trifling
error due to lack of experience with this machine and this method of starting, the machine
would undoubtedly have flown beautifully’ (Crouch, 2003, p. 43). The aircraft that Orville
flew on that important day in history was also the starting point in the aviation advances from
an extremely manual mode of flight to the point of automation and computerisation found on
the modern flight deck today.
A vast difference in design exists between the aircraft being built today and the wooden
device flown by the Wright brothers over a century ago. The present advanced flight deck
incorporates flight data information on cathode ray tubes (CRTs) and liquid crystal displays
(LCDs) – the main reason that many observers refer to these systems as ‘glass cockpits’
(Risukhin, 2001). According to Risukhin (2001), the complete digitised flight deck system
consists of electronic attitude director indicators (EADIs); electronic horizontal situation
indicators (EHSIs); data management systems (FMS) and symbol generators to drive the
electronic indicators; navigation system control and display units (ND); and air data systems.
Various crew alerting systems (in Boeing the EICAS, and in Airbus the ECAM) are
incorporated on the modern flight deck to support pilots to operate aircraft more safely in
today’s congested airspace. This includes for example a Traffic Collision and Avoidance
System (TCAS) and Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) avoidance equipment, such as the
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) technology
The modern jet airliner has evolved from that first flight of the imagination of Leonardo Da
Vinci and is the culmination of that dream, integrating in its complex technology almost all of
humankind’s scientific thought to date (Paolo, 2001). Only computer technology has
paralleled aviation in its rapid evolutionary advance; and the modern jet airliner is the proud
heir of both fields of human endeavour, combining aviation and computer technology in an
elegant fusion. The quantum leap in flight deck design and layout is evidenced from the
impressive glass panel displays found on the modern advanced aircraft.
Although flight deck automation has been well received by the aviation industry and pilots,
many human factor issues have been raised. Research suggests that the increased presence of
computers (such as flight management computers, FMC’s) on board modern flight decks have
resulted in some flight crew members’ spending an increasing amount of ‘heads-down’ time
during critical phases of flight, a key contribution to distractions resulting in an incident or
accident (Damos, John & Lyall, 2005). Traditionally, the operation of analogue flight deck
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aircraft meant that pilots were often making an exceedingly large number of minute mistakes.
The modern advanced flight deck incorporates highly sophisticated computers which now
take care of the mundane or routine aircraft operations. Any mistakes committed by the
human operator on a modern flight deck are more likely to result in a catastrophic disaster
(Edwards, 1988). For example, the use of reduced or flexible thrust take-offs have become an
everyday method of ameliorating wear and tear on jet engines. However, an error in the input
of the correct temperature (a two-digit number) into the flight management computer may
result in disaster if the aircraft fails to accelerate during the take-off phase (when the assumed
temperature is far higher then is actually required). This highlights the fallibility of the basic
computer-human dyadic. Experts in the field refer to this as GIGO or ‘garbage-in-garbageout’ (Damos et al., 2005). In other words, this dyadic is only as strong as the weakest link, the
human being. There is ample proof that human error is a root cause of accidents in complex
systems (NTSB, 2009).
Analyses of the reasons and variables implicated in aircraft incidents and accidents indicated
that the rise in the number of aircraft accidents in the past 20 years have emerged as a
symptom of the increasing use of automation throughout the world aviation industry. (FAA,
1996; Ishibashi, Kanda & Ishida,1999; Skitka, Mosier, Burdick & Rosenblatt,2000).
Examples of accidents were the breakdown in flightcrew/automation coordination were the
main contributor factor included an Airbus A300-600 operated by China Airlines that crashed
at Nagoya in 1994; a Boeing 757 operated by American Airlines that crashed near Cali,
Columbia in1995; and recently a Boeing 737-800 operated by Turkish Airlines that went
down in a muddy field less than a mile short of the runway at Amsterdam's Schiphol airport
shortly before it was due to land on 25 February 2009.
However, it is a statistically documented fact that commercial jet air travel is still the safest
mode of transportation known to mankind (NTSB, 2009) – and this is why the public is often
confused, shocked and horrified by any accidents involving advanced automated aircraft
(Risukhin, 2001). In trying to answer the question of why such accidents happen, one must
critically analyse the new problems and challenges presented by the introduction and
utilisation of computerisation in aircraft (Risukhin, 2001). It is therefore important to
understand the human perception of an advanced automated environment in the execution of
the safe operation of these aircraft. A negative or false perception of technology and
automation may have an adverse impact on safety issues, but over-familiarity with the system
may bring about boredom, fatigue and complacency.
Human factor issues and automation
The term “automation” has for some time been difficult to define, although many researchers
working in the field have agreed that the term “…generally means replacing human
functioning with machine functioning”, whilst in the term flight deck automation “…we
generally mean that some tasks or portions of tasks performed by the human crew can be
assigned, by the choice of the crew, to machinery” (Wiener, 1989, p. 121). Funk, Lyall,
Wilson, Vint, Niemczyk, Surotegu and Owen (1999, p. 56) also indicated that “Automation is
the allocation of functions to machines that would otherwise be allocated to humans”.
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The integration of automation into commercial aircraft flight decks has contributed to
economic profitability of airlines, has allowed more efficient flight path management and
reduced the number of crew needed for operation from three to two simultaneously improving
overall safety (Kabbani 1995; Rudisill, 1995; Wiener, 1993). However, while there were
benefits from automation, several unique human factor issues have been raised by both the
civil aviation authorities and by human behaviour experts (Billings, 1997; FAA, 1996; Kabay,
1996; Palmer, 1995; Parasuraman, & Riley, 1997, Wood, 2004). These human factor issues
relate to concerns about poor interface design, pilot complacency and over-reliance on
automation, a loss of manual flying skills, and pilots' lack of understanding of the new
equipment, mode errors and 'automation surprises'.
Aviation human factors literature (FAA, 1996; Funk, Lyall, & Riley, 1995; Funk and Lyall,
1999, 2000; Funk et al., 1999; Kabbani, 1995, Rudisill, 1995; Sarter, 1995, 1996; Sherman,
Helmreich & Merritt, 1997; Wood, 2004) refers to many problems and concerns with flight
deck automation. The most comprehensive study on automation issues affecting pilots
operating advanced automated aircraft was coordinated and reported by Funk, Lyall, &
Riley, 1995, Funk and Lyall, 1999, 2000, and Funk et al., 1999. The contribution of various
aviation scholars and aviation operators resulted in research output that have been intergraded
and documented in the public domain and can easily be accessed via the worl wide web.
Various contributors have identified 92 critical issues affecting pilots with regard to
automation and the operation of advanced aircraft. The 92 issues which were identified by
analysing different sources and surveying actual operators are too cumbersome to be listed in
its entirety for this article. However, ranked by the sum of evidence strengths, the following
10 automation issues were acknowledged by Funk and Lyall (2000:5) as the most significant
factors affecting pilots operating advanced aircraft.
o Understanding: ‘Pilots may not understand the structure and function of automation or
the interaction of automation devices well enough to safely perform their duties’.
o Mode awareness: ‘The behavior of automation devices -- what they are doing now and
what they will do in the future based upon pilot input or other factors -- may not be
apparent to pilots, possibly resulting in reduced pilot awareness of automation behavior
and goals’.
o Complacency/Trust: ‘Pilots may become complacent because they are overconfident in
and uncritical of automation, and fail to exercise appropriate vigilance, sometimes to the
extent of abdicating responsibility to it. This can lead to unsafe conditions’.
o Design: ‘Displays (including aural warnings and other auditory displays), display
formats, and display elements may not be designed for detectability, discriminability, and
interpretability. This may cause important information to be missed or misinterpreted’.
o Training: ‘Training philosophy, objectives, methods, materials, or equipment may be
inadequate to properly train pilots for safe and effective automated aircraft operation’.
o Inappropriate usage: ‘Pilots may use automation in situations where it should not be
used’.
o Complexity: ‘Automation may be too complex, in that it may consist of many interrelated
components and may operate under many different modes. This makes automation
difficult for pilots to understand and use safely’.
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o Surprise events: ‘Automation may perform in ways that are unintended, unexpected, and
perhaps unexplainable by pilots, possibly creating confusion, increasing pilot workload to
compensate, and sometimes leading to unsafe conditions’.
o Dissemination of information: ‘Important information that could be displayed by
automation is not displayed, thereby limiting the ability of pilots to make safe decisions
and actions’.
o Reduced skill: ‘Pilots may lose psychomotor and cognitive skills required for flying
manually, or for flying non-automated aircraft, due to extensive use of automation’.
A qualitative analysis of the freehand comments of 400 pilots by Rudisill (1995), based on
the results from an international survey conducted by James, McClumpha, Green, Wilson and
Belyavin (1991a) revealed issues closely aligned with the top ten issues as reported in the
automation data base. The results of this examination resulted in the following issues and
recommendations from Rudisill (1995):
o General issues related to automation: The general agreement among participants was
that automation was a good thing. However, concerns were raised that inexperienced
pilots may be led into a false sense of security by the automatics. One solution proposed
to resolve this issue is to provide mechanisms for inexperienced pilots to gain and develop
a firm base in piloting skill.
o Flight deck design issues: In general the respondents were happy with the overall design
in the automated cockpit. Issues were raised, however, regarding the interpretation of
flight instrument displays and unnoticed events in map shift (loss of accuracy in
navigational displays). Rudisill (1995) suggests that transition training for new ‘glass’
pilots should emphasise self-discipline and vigilance in monitoring raw data information.
o
Understanding how to use automation: The general comments from participants
regarding the integration and use of automation elements was positive. Some issues raised
in this respect concerned pilots’ lack of knowledge about the intended behaviour of the
aircraft in certain modes of flight. Pilots should have the ability to disconnect the
automation and take manual control in the event of adverse aircraft behaviour in critical
phases of flight to mitigate uncertainty (Rudisill, 1995).
o
Crew coordination and personal issues: Respondents commented that ‘automation
may reduce workload in low workload flight phases and may increase workload in high
workload flight phases; also, workload may be increased dramatically during abnormal
situations and failures’ (Rudisill, 1995, p. 290). It was also noted that crews were affected
by boredom and complacency during periods of low workload. Again, crew discipline and
improved systems knowledge helps to minimise this kind of problem.
Other studies conducted by Mosier, Skitka, Heers and Burdick (1998) have found extensive
evidence that the advanced flight deck and the extensive use of automation have created an
environment of automation bias and flawed heuristics (as a short-cut to decision-making, a
symptom of complacency) which may threaten safety. As early as the 1990’s, research
conducted by Parasuraman, Molloy and Singh (1993) and Parasuraman and Riley (1997),
identified the need to optimise pilot workload in order to reduce boredom and mitigate the
consequences of complacency. The identification of workload optimisation is important on an
advanced flight deck. In an attempt to evaluate the differences in workload between pilots
flying traditional analogue aircraft versus pilots operating modern flight deck aircraft,
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Laudeman and Palmer (1992), found a significant difference in aircrew performance. They
indicated that those pilots that prefer to make use of the automated features in modern flight
decks experienced higher workloads than those in traditional cockpits as well as those in
automated flight decks that opt not to use the automation. Damos, John and Lyall (2005) also
examined how the frequencies of 23 activities varied as a function of cockpit automation. The
study examined general ‘house-keeping’ activities and communication, as well as flight path
control, which may be regarded as one of the most fundamental factors in reducing aircraft
accidents and incidents. That is, maintaining the correct flight profile is what keeps an aircraft
in the correct (safe) three-dimensional space. Human factor errors emerge when the pilot has
to cope with and integrate an excessive number of sources of information. Paradoxically,
behavioural errors can also occur when the workload is too low. Workload conflict appears to
be a problem that contributes to human error on the advanced flight deck (Kantowitz &
Casper, 1988).
Because of the concerns of the effects of advanced automation on pilots behaviour, the United
Kingdom (UK) Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) requested the RAF Institute of Aviation
Medicine ‘to assess the effects of advance automation on UK pilots in order to identify
possible problems’ and to research the ‘opinions and attitudes of UK pilots to advance flight
deck automation’ (James et al., 1991a, p. 3.2). The researchers developed a questionnaire that
included 78 items to assess pilots’ opinions regarding aircraft automation. Ten of the items
were related to general attitude towards aircraft automation and 68 items addresses several
human factor concerns and automation issues on advanced flight decks. This included design,
reliability, flight management system input, output and feedback, skills, training, crew
interaction, monitoring and procedures, workload, and overall impressions. All the items of
the questionnaire comprised of two statements defining opposite viewpoints with a Likert
type scale, from 1 to 5 between them, indicating grades of opinion.
James et al. (1991a) used the questionnaire to survey the opinion of UK commercial pilots
towards advanced flight deck automation. The attitude survey was distributed to all UK
licensed pilots (approximately 11000). 1372 questionnaires were returned of which 572 were
usable. Principle components analysis with varimax rotation of the responses on the 68 items
identified four main factors. These were Understanding/Mastery, Workload, Design, and
Skills. The four factors accounted for 31.48% of the explained variance (James et al., 1991a,
pp. 3.2-3.5). Understanding/Mastery consisted of ‘comprehension, expertise, knowledge and
use of the system.’ Workload entailed ‘workload, demand, stress and task efficiency.’ Design
referred to ‘ergonomic efficiency, design and displays’ and Skills encompassed handling
skills, crew interaction, and self-confidence’ (p.3.5). Unfortunately the authors did not report
on the reliability of the four factors, neither did they provide a list of all the significant items
that signify the rotated factors (James et al., 1991a, b; McClumpha, James, Green, &
Belyavin, 1991).
Singh, Deaton and Parasuraman (2001) ’developed (sic) a scale to assess pilot attitudes
towards cockpit automation’. They used 30 items of the original questionnaire of the James et
al. (1991a) survey. These items included the first 10 general attitude items and 20 items
associated with the humanfactors and automated systems. Singh et al., (2001) used both
positive and negative statements in the 30 item questionnaire. The favorable statements were
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scored on a scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) and the unfavorable
statements were scored on a scale ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5)
(Singh et al. 2001, p. 208).
The questionnaire was administered to 170 pilots at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
163 pilots with experience of advanced automated aircraft responded on the survey of which
111 completed the questionnaires satisfactory. Principal component analysis with varimax
rotation of the responses on the 20 item section of the questionnaire revealed the presence of
six factors with eigen values greater than one (Singh et al., 2001, p.208). These six factors,
that accounted for 58, 3% of the explained variance, were named: workload (5 items with
loadings of 0.58 to 0.77); design (5 items with loadings of 0.35 to 0.74); skills (4 items with
loadings of 0.37 to 0.71); feedback (3 items with loadings of 0.63 to 0.70); reliability (4 items
with loadings of 0.33 to 0.82); and self-confidence (3 items with loadings of 0.31 to 0.85).
The reliability of the six factors was also computed using coefficient alpha which ranged
from 0.75 to 0.98. Although the Singh et al., (2001) reported satisfactory reliability
coefficients the inclusion of three items that cross-loaded on more than one factor are highly
questionable. If these three items were omitted from the last two factors, both reliability and
self-confidence would not have been included in the underlying factor structure of the
questionnaire. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 646) the interpretation of factors
defined by only one or two variables is not feasible.
Further research into human-automation interaction in today’s advanced automated aircraft
remains important to identify the core human factor concerns and automation issues related to
current flight deck automation. The present study is an effort to aid in the identifying and
describing specific areas of pilots concern regarding their performance in a highly advanced
automated environment and their opinion about advanced automation systems. This article
builds on the research of James et al. (1991a) to extend our knowledge and understanding of
pilots’ attitudes towards aircraft automation. The present study, however, differs from the
preceding study in several ways. First, it examined the perception of airline pilots from a
single South African airline. Second, all the pilots in the sample operate advanced third and
fourth generation automated aircraft -- the state of the art technology in the industry today.
Third, it focused on specific variables (individual and situational) that may account for
variance in pilots’ perception towards flight deck automation. New items were generated and
a number of the original items from the survey of James et al. (1991a) were adapted to ensure
relevance to the operational procedures and the types of aircraft the airline operates.
The primary objective of part 1 of this study was therefore to construct a valid and reliable
instrument to measure the perceptions of airline pilots towards the core automation issues
linked with operating advanced automated aircraft and to offer psychometric evidence for
such a measure, termed the Automation Attitude Questionnaire (AAQ).
.

Research design
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Research approach
In order to achieve the study objective a quantitative research approach based on the
positivist paradigm was followed. A survey was conducted, using a structured
questionnaire to collect the research data from a purposive sample of airline pilots. The
data were analysed in accordance with the associational design as suggested by Field
(2005, pp. 107, 619, 667). The associational design was used to establish the correlation
between items scores on the questionnaire. The inter-correlation coefficients were
employed to identify the underlying dimensions or factor structure of the questionnaire and
to calculate the internal consistency and unidimensionality of the factors.
Research method
Participants
The research group represented a purposive sample of 262 current airline pilots at a major
South African carrier operating both Airbus and Boeing type aircraft. Biographical
information was elicited from all the participants in the first section of the questionnaire.
The biographical characteristics of the participants are summarized in Table 1. Of this group,
245 were male pilots and 17 were female pilots. The small proportion (6.5%) of female
participants was due to the fact that women have only recently started choosing professional
flying as a career option. These numbers reflect the current low proportional representation
of female pilots (6.1%) engaged in commercial aviation in South Africa (SACAA, 2007).
The sample ranged from lower entry pilots (in-flight relief crew) to high level pilots (senior
training captains on long-range flights). It also represented diversity in terms of the type of
aircraft flown, pilots’ age and level of experience. 35.5% of the respondents had flown
Boeing and 63.4% had flown Airbus type aircraft. The participants’ ages ranged from 25 to
65 years (a spread of 40 years). There mean age was 44.14 years (SD = 9.556). The
respondents’ number of years of flying experience ranged from between 4 years and 46 years,
with an mean of 23.73 years (SD = 10.373). The mean number of flying hours of the sample
was 12 231 hours (SD = 5 636). The mean digital flight hours logged by the sample was
4 691.13 hours (SD = 2 530.004). The total digital flying time logged was expected to be
significantly lower than the total flying time, as the carrier only began to operate modern
automated aircraft in the last ten years or so. Only 24.9% of the respondents had any
university level education.
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Table 1.
Biographical Data of Respondents.
VARIABLE

FREQUENCY

PERCENTAGE

245

93.5%

17

6.5%

Dedicated in-flight relief pilot

16

6.1%

Co-pilot (Short Range)

60

22.9%

Co-pilot (Long Range)

49

18.7%

Captain (Short Range)

48

18.3%

Captain (Long Range)

53

20.2%

Training Captain (Short Range)

11

4.2%

Training Captain (Long Range)

18

6.9%

5

1.9%

GENDER
Male
Female

POSITION

Other

AGE
25 – 35 years
36 – 45 years
46 – 55 years
56 – 65 years

59
88
67
48

22.5%
33.6%
25.6%
18.3%

LEVEL OF EDUCATION
High school

163

62.5%

Diploma

33

12.6%

Bachelors degree

40

15.3%

Post Graduate

25

9.6%
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INITIAL FLYING TRAINING
131

Military
Cadet

21

Self (Part-Time)

72

Self (Full Time)

37

50.0%
8.0%
27.5%
14.1%

EXPERT YEARS
4 to 15 years
16 to 25 years

63
89

24.0%
34.0%

26 to 35 years

65

24.8%

36 to 46 years

44

16.8%

1

0.4%

33

12.6%

53

20.2%

46

17.6%

48

18.3%

20

7.6%

60

22.9%

2

0.8%

1 500 to 7 900 hours

65

24.8%

7 901 to 11 200 hours

69

26.3%

11 201 to 16 000 hours

56

21.4%

16 001 to 27 000 hours

69

26.3%

3

1.1%

Missing

TOTAL DIGITAL FLYING TIME
LOGGED
0 to 2 000 hours
2 001 to 3 000 hours
3 001 to 4 000 hours
4 001 to 5 000 hours
5 001 to 6 000 hours
>6 001 hours
Missing

TOTAL FLYING TIME LOGGED

Missing
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Measuring Instrument
To identify the core human factor issues related to current flight deck automation and to
assess airline pilots’ perceptions of these issues, a measuring instrument called the
Automation Attitude Questionnaire (AAQ) was constructed. Various research output in the
field of flight deck automation were considered as points of departure in constructing the
AAQ. The Items for the AAQ were generated by analysing the fundamental framework of
research undertaken by Wiener (1989) and studies conducted by Funk and Lyall (2000),
James, et al. (1991a, b) and Sherman et al., (1997).
The item pool of the initial AAQ included 85 items. Thirty three of these items were firstly
selected and adopted from the 78 items of the attitude survey developed by James, et al.,
(1991a,b). Secondly, a further 35 items were extracted from the survey and adjusted to ensure
clarity and relevance in the context of the South African airline that participated in the current
study. Afterwards, these items were added to the AAQ. Thirdly, after discussions with experts
and a further analysis of the literature, 17 new items were generated and were included in the
questionnaire. Each of the 85 items of the initial AAQ presented one statement that covered
various domains that encompass automation training, flying skills, workload, ergonomics,
automation performance etc. All the statements (except for the biographic variables) were
rated on a seven-point Likert-type scale to measure the perceptions of respondents at an
approximate interval level. Unfavourable statements were scored on a scale ranging from
strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (7). The favourable statements were reverse coded to
produce a measure where high scores indicated positive perceptions and low scores resulted
in a more negative perception of automation.
In its final form, the preliminary AAQ consisted of three sections. Section 1 related to the
pilots’ biographical information. Section 2 consisted of the 85 items related to pilots’
perceptions, opinions and behaviour regarding automation. This second section attempted to
determine the core human factor issues and pilot concerns related to flight deck automation.
An additional part, section 3 was added to gain qualitative input from respondents.
Participants were given the opportunity to comment, either positively or negatively on
operating highly advanced automated aircraft.
Research procedure
A list of all the airline pilots employed at a large South African carrier was obtained from the
organisation’s human resources department. Permission was granted from the executive and
chief pilot of the particular company to distribute the questionnaires to the entire pilot
population in their employment. A total of 800 questionnaires were distributed on an
individual basis via a box-drop method.
In order to maximise the response rate a cover letter with the endorsement from management
was attached to each questionnaire. The cover letter also stated the purpose of the research
and further stressed voluntary participation and anonymity. Anonymity was ensured by
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eliminating the need to provide a name on the questionnaire. The completed questionnaires
were collected manually from a dedicated collection box. A total of 262 (33%) usable
questionnaires were received. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), this number of
responses was adequate for an exploratory factor analysis.
Statistical analysis
The main statistical analyses for the study were accomplished through the utilisation of the
Windows Statistical Programme for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 15. Exploratory
factor analysis (EFA) was used to explore the internal structure and validity of the AAQ. EFA
was carried out by means of principal axis factoring and rotated using the promax procedure
with Kaiser’s normalization to obtain an oblique generated factor solution for the AAQ. To
assess compliance with the distribution requirements, Bartlett’s test of sphericity and the
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy were used. In order to determine
the number of significant item factors, Kaiser’s criterion, Horn’s parallel analysis and Catell’s
scree-plot were used (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). According to Hayton, Allen and Scarpello
(2004), parallel analysis provides the most accurate estimate of the number of true factors in a
complex dataset. The internal consistency of the AAQ was assessed by calculating the
Cronbach Alpha coefficient for each factor. Item-reliability index of the individual items
were calculated to establish whether the items contributed to the underlying construct of the
factors (Gregory, 2004), and the average correlations between the items of each factor were
calculated to examine the homogeneity and unidimensionality of the retained factors
(Cortina, 1993; Clark & Watson, 1995). Frequencies and distributive statistics were used to
describe the characteristics of the sample and to analyse the distribution (mean, standard
deviations, skweness and kurtosis) of the responses.
Results
Exploratory Factor Analysis
The Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was carried out by means of principal axis factoring,
and was rotated using the promax procedure (κ = 4) with Kaiser’s normalisation to an oblique
solution. This allowed the researchers to seek the lowest number of factors that account
for the common variance in the set of 85 variables. In the first round of EFA, the 85 items
of the AAQ were inter-correlated and rotated to form a simple structure by means of the
promax rotation. Owing to the size (85 X 85), the inter-correlation matrix is not reported in
the study. Based on Kaiser's (1961) criterion (eigenvalues larger than unity) 25 factors were
postulated. The 25 factors explained 67.79% of the variance in the factor space of data. The
factor analysis yielded more factors in the real test space than was expected. This is probably
due to the presence of differentially skew items, as described by Schepers (1992). However,
the results of Horn’s parallel analysis and the scree-plot presented in Figure 1 confirmed that
there were five significant constructs in the dataset. Parallel analysis indicated a break in the
scree-plot between roots six and five. However, the curve of the eigenvalues of the random
data set (the broken line) intersected the curve of the eigenvalues for the real data (the solid
line) at root six. To avoid under-factoring, it was decided to include all the items of the six
factors in the second round of EFA.
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The items included in the six factors were first scrutinised; and the items which had factor
loadings lower than 0.35 were omitted. A total of 33 items were retained and were subjected
to the second round of EFA with promax rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test for
measuring sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity displayed satisfactory results.
Both diagnostic tests confirmed that the data was suitable for factor analysis. The calculated
KMO value of 0.902 was greater than 0.7. Bartlett’s test of sphericity [χ2 (528) = 3470.758,
p<0.01] confirmed that the properties of the correlation matrix of the item scores were
suitable for factor analysis.
Six factors with eigenvalues higher than one were extracted in the second round of EFA. The
six factors explained 55.297 percent of the total variance in the data. However, an inspection
of the results of the parallel analysis presented in Figure 2, a five factors solution seemed
more appropriate. Only one noteworthy item with a loading of 0.369 was associated with
Factor Six. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 646), the interpretation of factors
defined by only one or two variables is ‘risky’, under even the most exploratory of factor
analyses. Consequently, Factor Six was disregarded. This resulted in a 32 item questionnaire
that measure five factors related to flight deck automation. Of the 85 items included in the
preliminary AAQ, 13 of the 33 original items and 13 of the 35 adjusted items from the James,
et al. (1991a) survey, and five of the 17 new items were retained.
Figure 1.
Scree plot of the actual and the random data of 85 factors.
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The factor loadings and corrected Item-total correlation of the items in each of the five factors
of the AAQ are summarized in Table 2. The corrected item-total correlation of each item in
the five factors was satisfactory and comply with the criteria suggested by DeVellis (2003)
and Field (2005). DeVellis (2003) views an item with an item-total correlation of more than
0.20 as generally acceptable to be included. Field (2005) however, suggested that if an itemtotal correlation is less than 0.3, that a particular item should not be included as a variable in a
scale. The values of the corrected item-total correlation in the five factors were all above 0.3.
The percentage variance, sums of squared loadings, squared multiple correlations and factor
correlations are reported in Table 3.
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Table 2.
The factor loadings and corrected item-total correlation of the items that define the five
factors of the AAQ.
Factor and Relevant Items

Factor
Loading

Corrected
Item-total
Correlation

Factor 1
0.724

Q38. I'm often confused about why the aircraft's automatics
respond in the way it does.

0.831

Q36. I am often surprised by the aircraft's response to my
FMS inputs.

0.816

0.722

Q40. I often tend to question the output from the automation
system.

0.624

0.638

Q41. I find myself trying to guess what this aircraft is going
to do next.

0.610

0.610

Q23. In the event of a partial system failure, it is never
obvious which part of the automatic system failed.

0.567

0.475

Q37. I feel that the amount of feedback I get from the
automatics is excessive.

0.557

0.557

Q42. The feedback I get in response to my inputs is usually
too slow.

0.546

0.512

Q39. Even after receiving adequate feedback from the
system, I still won't correct my fault.

0.433

0.519

Factor 2
Q56. I think that there should be more simulator training for
the conversion onto this aircraft.
Q55. The computer based-training was insufficient for me to
fully understand this aircraft.

142

0.831

0.698

0.694

0.556

Q57. I feel that a lot more hours can be devoted to route
training on this aircraft.

0.641

0.577

Q54. I think that there should have been a lot more
classroom training for the conversion onto this aircraft.

0.631

0.644

Q58. There is insufficient recurrent training on this aircraft.

0.589

0.544

Q59. The training I received was inappropriate to line
operations.

0.444

0.498

Q60. My transition onto this aircraft was extremely difficult.

0.367

0.443

Q78. I feel detached from the aircraft.

0.813

0.678

Q79. I feel exposed to risk by the automation.

0.745

0.683

Q77. The aircraft is always ahead of me.

0.671

0.642

Q80. Whenever I fly this aircraft, I feel a lot more stress then
when I flew traditional aircraft.
Table 2 continued

0.605

Q75. The automation system greatly decreases my
confidence as a pilot.

0.509

Q64. Automation impedes crew co-ordination.

0.495

Factor 3

0.594
0.569
0.651

Factor 4
Q73. The automation actually increases workload during
critical phases of flight.

0.797

0.641

Q72. In the event of a flight plan change, the ‘heads-down’
time required is much more than in traditional flight decks.

0.733

0.591
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0.465

Q69. I've noticed that there is much more ‘heads-down’ time
in this cockpit.

0.575

Q71. It is very difficult for the crew to maintain a good lookout when flying this aircraft.

0.567

Q74. In general the overall workload on this flight deck has
increased.

0.524

0.528

Q70. The procedures used to operate this aircraft don't suit it
at all.

0.367

0.494

0.583

Factor 5
Q16. I find that the aircraft automatics are extremely
unreliable.

0.646

Q13. The displays in my aircraft make very poor use of
colour.

0.590

Q17. The level of reliability and redundancy of the
automatics is insufficient to conduct extended range
operations.

0.522

Q14. I'm extremely unhappy with the set-up of the displays
in my aircraft.

0.500

Q21. If the automatics fail, most of the time I don't try to
restore the system.

0.421
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0.540
0.438

0.445

0.424

0.404

Table 3.
Eigenvalues, Percentage Variance, Sums of Squared Loadings, Squared Multiple
Correlations and Factor Correlations of the Five Factors of the AAQ.
Factors

1

2

3

4

5

Eigenvalues

9.577

2.315

2.049

1.780

1.473

Percentage Variance

29.022

7.014

6.210

5.393

4.463

Sums of Squared Loadings (SSL)

7.071

5.453

6.797

5.450

3.872

Correlation 0.991

0.974

0.977

0.980

0.930

Squared
(SMC)

Multiple

Factor inter-correlation matrix
Factors

1

2

3

4

5

1. Comprehension

-

0.509

0.603

0.515

0.488

2. Training

0.509

-

0.501

0.419

0.250

3. Trust

0.603

0.501

-

0.569

0.412

4. Workload

0.515

0.419

0.569

-

0.351

5. Design

0.488

0.250

0.412

0.351

-

The five factor solution explains 51.102 percent of the total variance in the data. The five
factors inter-correlated significantly with one another (r = 0.250 to 0.603). The strength of
the correlations indicates that the five factors are closely related in measuring constructs
related to flight deck automation. Although the relatively high inter-correlations suggest
overlapping variability, the Squared Multiple Correlations (SMCs) of 0.930 to 0.991 between
the item scores and the factor scores indicated that all the factors were sufficiently defined by
the relevant items. The factor scores of the respondents were calculated by means of Bartlett’s
method as described in Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 651). Scales were created for each
factor and these were labeled according to the general content of their significant related
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items. The five factors or core automation issues linked with operating advanced automated
aircraft were labeled Comprehension, Training, Trust, Workload and Design respectively.
The reliability of the five factors of the AAQ
The reliability of the factors of the Automation Attitude Questionnaire was determined by
making use of Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Field, 2005). The average mean correlations
between the items of each factor were also calculated to examine the internal
homogeneity and unidimensionality of the five factors (Cortina, 1993; Clark & Watson,
1995). The means, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis, average mean correlations
and Cronbach's Alpha for the five factors are provided in Table 4.
Table 4.
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability of the Factors of the AAQ (n=262).
Descriptive
Compre
Training
Trust
Workload
Statistics
hension
Mean
SD
Skewness
Sk error
Kurtosis
Ku error
r(Mean)
Alpha

46.267
7.079
-1.265
0.150
2.124
0.300
0.59
0.84

38.821
7.401
-0.675
0.150
0.011
0.300
0.56
0.82

37.798
4.606
-1.584
0.150
3.323
0.300
0.63
0.85

32.034
6.224
-0.728
0.150
0.302
0.300
0.55
0.79

Design

31.053
3.992
-2.085
0.150
7.276
0.300
0.45
0.70

According to Table 4, the Cronbach alpha coefficients for the five factors of the AAQ were
satisfactory. Compared to the guideline for alpha ≥0.70, recommended by Nunnally and
Bernstein (1994), the alpha coefficient for the five factors yielded acceptable values (F1
=0.844; F2 =0.817; F3 =0.845; F4 =0.786; F5 =0.700). Furthermore, none of the items, if
deleted, increases the internal consistency of a factor. All the mean inter-item correlations of
the five factors were within the range of 0.15 to 0.50 as suggested by Clark and Watson
(1995).The high mean inter-item correlations of 0.45 to 0.63 is probably the result of the
specificity of the target constructs. According to Clark and Watson (1995), a much higher
average inter-item correlation can be expected when one is measuring a narrow construct. The
scores on the five factors of the AAQ appear to satisfy the requirements of homogeneity and
unidimensionality and can be considered to be representative of the specific factor that
they are assessing.
Discussion
The implementation of aircraft automation has for some time been the root of many debates
within the aviation fraternity. The introduction of highly computerised flight deck technology
has presented airline organisations with interesting human resource challenges. These
challenges need to be met so as to maintain an efficient and optimal operational front. The
perceptions of airline pilots with regard to flight deck automation issues has not yet been
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researched in South Africa and one of the challenges facing airlines is to determine what
impact these perceptions have on successfully training and converting competent pilots to
new advanced jet aircraft from traditional older generation aircraft (Barnett, 2005). The
objective of part one of this study was therefore, to construct a valid and reliable instrument
to measure the perceptions of airline pilots towards the core automation issues linked with
operating advanced automated aircraft and to assess the psychometric properties of the
measure and to refine the instrument.
A questionnaire named the Automation Attitude Questionnaire or AAQ was constructed to
survey airline pilots’ perceptions regarding automation issues linked with operating advanced
automated aircraft. A total of 85 items were initially included in the AAQ. After two
applications of exploratory factor analysis 32 of these items yielded a five-factor solution.
The five factors showed adequate factorial validity, unidimensionality and reliability. The
magnitudes of the factor scores off the items in each of the five factors were all larger then
0.35 with factor scores ranging from 0.36 to 0.83. The mean inter-item correlations ranged
from 0.45 to 0.63 and the alpha coefficients from 0.73 to 0.85. These results provided
sufficient support for the psychometric adequacy of the AAQ.
The five factors that associated with the core issues or demands of operating an automated
flight deck or glass cockpit were labeled Comprehension, Training, Trust, Workload and
Design.
Comprehension consisted of 8 items and includes issues such as how a pilot interprets and
understands the capabilities, limitations, modes, and operating principles and functioning of
the automated flight deck system. This factor includes pilot’s competence to interpret the
flight mode annunciator (FMA) and manage automation “surprises” (Parasuraman & Riley,
1997).
Training, the second dimension, was made up of seven items that refers to the training and
learning required to get a pilot to an adequate standard or to the level needed to operate the
automation system. The elements of this factor refer to quality time spent in classroom
training, on simulator training, recurrent training, route training, line training and transition
training on advanced aircraft.
The third factor was labeled Trust and includes six items that deal with the level of belief and
assurance a pilot has in the performance of automated devices. It measured pilots’
identification with the automation system; feelings of increased exposure to risk and stress
due to automation, feelings that the aircraft is ahead of him or her; and being detached from
the human-machine loop. A specific item of this factor also refers to the impedance in crew
co-ordination due to system trust issues.
The fourth factor looked at perceptions of workload and includes six items. The primary
issues covered in this factor are increases in workload during critical phases of flight.
Elements of the workload factor consist of the amount of time spent instructing the
automation computer via the flight management system (heads-down time) and thereafter
having it accomplish a specific task correctly. Other elements also include the procedures
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required for safely operating the aircraft and the ability to maintain adequate situational
awareness.
The fifth factor consists of five items related to the design characteristics and reliability of
automation systems. This includes the ergonomic features and display design of the flight
deck. Elements of the display design included the adequate presentation of accessible, useful,
understandable and diagnostic visual and sound information, as well as the ease in utilising
the information.
The five factors are closely linked to a number of human factor issues and concerns raised
and cited by various authors in research publications and are also related to automation issues
documented in international regulatory authority reports such as the FAA of the USA and the
CAA of the UK. Elements of the present factors parallel those issues and demands associated
with flight deck automation mentioned by Billings (1997), FAA (1996), Funk and Lyall
(2000), James et al. (1991a), Mosier, et.al. (1998), Palmer (1995), Parasuraman and Riley
(1997), Sarter and Woods (1994), Sarter, Woods and Billings (1997), Sherman (1997),
Wiener (1989), Wood (2004). These human factor issues included the following variables:
poor interface design; pilots' lack of understanding of the automated equipment; breakdown
in attention and knowledge; demands in mode awareness and ‘automation surprises’; uneven
distribution of workload; over trust and decreased vigilance; pilot complacency and overreliance on automation; loss of situational awareness; reduction of manual flying skills and
proficiency; communication and coordination demands; and the need for new approaches to
training.
Encouraging is the fact that the five factors identified in the present study also correspond
with the ten prominent automation issues identified by Funk and Lyall, 1998 and Funk, et al.
(1999). After intensive evidence based research, using various sources and criteria, Funk, et
al., (1999, p. 120), listed the following five automation issues as the most important concerns
that require solutions: ‘‘understanding of automation may be inadequate; behavior of
automation may not be apparent; pilots may be overconfident in automation; displays (visual
and aural) may be poorly designed; and training may be inadequate”.
A comparison of the results from this survey also indicates a strong commonality with the
factors identified by James et al., (1991) and Singh et al., (2001). Workload, skills and design
are common labels with understanding/mastery, self-confidence and comprehension sharing
similar elements. Feedback, reliability and trust also appear to share common items. Overall
the results indicate that common threads permeate pilot perceptions of automated flight decks
and these are consistent over time. The results of this study resonates the capability of the
AAQ to measure and assess airline pilots’ perception of the most prominent issues and
concerns in operating advance automated aircraft.
Practical application
The results of the statistical analysis of the responses on the AAQ suggest that the
questionnaire is sufficiently reliable and valid to capture the present sample of airline pilots’
perceptions of flight deck automation. Consequently aviation human factor specialists and
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aviation psychologists can use the instrument with confidence to gather valid and reliable data
about automation perceptions held by airline pilots in South Africa. Understanding key
concepts and fundamental issues associated with attitudes, perceptions and behaviour that
exist within the sphere of advanced flight decks, has significant benefits for the aviation
industry at large. A concise understanding of this topic will benefit airlines and other
organisations to design and develop specifically targeted training material and to positively
influence their pilots in accepting automation. However, elements that influence overall
perceptions of automation may depend on the type of organisation, nature of flight training,
flying experience, type of aircraft, computer literacy, operational position, etc. Further
research should endeavour to identify those variables that may have an effect on the
perceptions of airline pilots. In the second part of this research project the relationship
between the biographical characteristics of the airline pilots’ and their perceptions of
automation were determined. The responses of the various pilot groups on the AAQ were
compared to one another and where applicable correlated with their scores on the different
factors. These results are offered in the part two of the article series.
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